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Abstract 
 
Bailey, Jeannine Marie (M.A., Philosophy) 
An Argument Against the Person-affecting View of Wrongness 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Alastair Norcross 
 
 
 
 An act is usually thought of as wrong only if it harms someone and to harm someone is, 
roughly speaking, to make her worse off.	  	  However, the view that an act is wrong only if it harms 
some particular individual restricts us to a person-affecting view about wrongness.  If an act is 
wrong that does not make any individual worse off, this wrongness cannot be explained in terms 
of person-affecting consequences.  I want to propose that an action can be wrong even if no 
particular individual is harmed by that act.  This argument relies on the idea that an action can be 
wrong because of the impersonal effects it has.  It is the goal of this paper to show that not only 
is this a plausible view about wrongness, but it is the correct view.  On this view, there can be 
wrongness in the harm caused by diminishing the overall value in the world or by making the 
world a worse place than it otherwise would have been.  One way to demonstrate that an action 
can wrong without being wrong for anyone in particular is by referring to Derek Parfit’s Non-
identity Problem.  In these cases, the only way to explain the wrongness is by appealing to a 
notion of impersonal harm.  These acts are wrong because they do not maximize the overall 
expected value in the world. 
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I.  Introduction  
 Can an act be wrong without wronging someone?  It is often claimed that an act is right 
or wrong only if it is right or wrong for someone.  This is known as the person-affecting view.  
Such an account of wrongness is common in ordinary thought.  However, I want to defend the 
view that an action can be wrong even if it is wrong for no particular person.  Although this is 
not a reigning view about the wrongness of actions, I think it can be shown that there is a sense 
in which an action can be wrong even if that action does not wrong anyone.  Whereas acts are 
generally said to be wrong due to the effects they have on particular people, this argument relies 
on the idea that an action can be wrong  because of the impersonal effects it has.  According 
to this view, an outcome can be better or worse even if it is better or worse for no one.   Further, I 
want to propose that an action can be wrong even if no particular individual is harmed by that act.  
In what follows, I will set out this view and provide examples to defend the possibility that an 
action can be wrong that does not wrong anyone in particular.  
 Since the non-identity problem is the source of this tension, I will begin by setting out 
this problem.  I will then set out some popular solutions to this problem, which do not rely on a 
rejection of the person-affecting view, and explain why I think these solutions fail.  Thirdly, I 
will present some principles we may appeal to in order to explain the badness in certain types of 
actions.  Though these principles do not by themselves explain why acts like these are wrong, 
they are a starting point.  I will then advance my own, stronger view which holds that not only 
are such acts bad, they are wrong.  Finally, after presenting another example, the Risky policy 
case, I will discuss objections to my view and what it implies about our duties to future 
generations. 
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II. The Non-Identity Problem 
  
 One way to demonstrate that an action can wrong without being wrong for anyone in 
particular is by referring to Derek Parfit’s argument known as the non-identity problem.1  In 
order to demonstrate this argument, I want to put forth two example cases.  First consider: 
 A young woman, Abey, is pregnant.  She sees a doctor who tells her that her baby will be 
born blind unless she undergoes a course of treatment.  The treatment consists of taking a small 
pill everyday for one month.  If Abbey takes the pills as directed, it will cure her child’s 
blindness.  The pill that will cure her child’s blindness is fully covered by her insurance, has no 
side effects, and is easy to swallow.  Despite this, Abbey decides not to take the pill. Nine 
months later she gives birth to a blind child named Steven.  
   Now consider one version of the non-identity problem, which goes as follows: 
A young woman, Wilma, has decided to conceive a child.  Before conceiving, Wilma sees a 
doctor about her decision and is informed that if she conceives now, she will give birth to a 
child who is blind.  Although a child with this disability will have a life that is worth living, 
the disability will impact the child’s life in a significant way.  However, the doctor informs 
her that if she takes a pill for one month, she can then conceive a child that will not have this 
disability.  The pill has no harmful side effects, it is easy to consume, and it is covered by her 
medical insurance.  Despite this, Wilma decides that taking the pill for a month is too 
inconvenient.  She does not accept the treatment and nine months later Wilma gives birth to a 
blind child named Pebbles.2   
  
 Whereas in the first example, Abbey’s decision will not affect the identity of her child, 
Wilma’s decision will affect who her child will be.  Abbey’s act was wrong because it harmed 
her child Steven.  The same cannot be said of Wilma’s act.  Though the most common intuition 
in this case is that Wilma has done something wrong, most people want to say that her act was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 359.	  2	  David Boonin is responsible for this version of the example.	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wrong because it wronged her child, Pebbles.  As Parfit shows, this intuition is mistaken.  
Because of certain facts about our actual reproductive systems, if Wilma had waited a month 
before she conceived, she would have given birth to a different child.  Wilma’s act did not wrong 
Pebbles, because if she had chosen to take the pills, the blind child would have never been born.  
Because we think the life of a person who is blind is a life worth living, we do not think this life 
is worse for her than if she had never existed.  Therefore, Wilma did not harm Pebbles by 
bringing her into existence.3   As Parfit contends, the objection to Wilma’s decision cannot be 
that it was worse for her child.  Before the child is born we can make this claim in the sense that 
“her child” refers to any child that Wilma might have.  However, once the child is born, it 
becomes clear that her decision was not worse for her child.  Wilma could not have given this 
child a better start in life.4  Pebbles was given the only start that was possible for her.  Thus, the 
claim that Wilma’s decision to conceive immediately was worse for her child cannot explain our 
objection to her decision.  Initially it seems as though Abbey’s and Wilma’s acts were wrong for 
the same reason.  However,	  if	  the	  reason	  in	  the	  already	  pregnant	  case	  is	  that	  the	  mother’s	  refusal	  to	  take	  the	  pill	  harms	  her	  child,	  that	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  Wilma	  and	  Pebbles	  case.	  
 Though we have the intuition that Wilma’s act (the act of choosing to conceive now 
rather than to take the pills before conceiving) was wrong, the non-identity problem makes it 
very difficult to explain why we think her act was wrong.  The following is a formulation of the 
argument that Wilma’s act was not wrong: 
 
P1) Wilma’s act does not make Pebbles worse off than she would otherwise have been. 
P2) If A’s act harms B, then it makes B worse off than B would otherwise have been. 
C1) Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles does not harm Pebbles. 
P3) Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles does not harm anyone else. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 359.	  4	  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 359-360.	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C2) Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles does not harm anyone. 
P4) If an act does not harm anyone, then the act does not wrong anyone. 
C3) Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles does not wrong anyone. 
P5) If an act does not wrong anyone, then the act is not wrong. 
C4) Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles is not wrong.5 
 
 One might claim that the first premise is incoherent because it requires us to compare 
existence with non-existence.  However, we often make this comparison.  For example, if you 
can either die now or be on fire and die in agony ten minutes later, most people would say it 
would be better for you to die now.  This is known as the “better off dead case.”  Yet, it seems 
strange to say that non-existence would be worse for A than existence because nothing can be 
worse for A if A does not exist.  Even if premise one is incoherent, however, we might still be 
stuck with premise 2 because if premise 1 is incoherent, then Pebbles is not harmed.   
 Premise 2 assumes a common sense account of harm.  Again, it states that if A’s act 
harms B, then it makes B worse off than B would otherwise have been.  This account of harm is 
known as the Counterfactual Comparative Account of harm.  In order to reject premise 2, one 
must show that there is a morally relevant sense in which harming someone does not make them 
worse off and that that is the sense in which Wilma harms Pebbles.  
 There are some alternatives to this account of harm.   One is known as the Temporal 
Comparative Account.  On this account, if A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse off than 
B was before A’s act.  In most temporal cases, the temporal account gets it right as often as the 
counterfactual account gets it right.  The temporal account even gets the right answers in some 
case in which the counterfactual account gets the wrong answers.  For instance, consider the 
“over determination case.”  Thug 1 and thug 2 are both sent to kill you.  If thug 1 does not kill 
you, then thug 2 definitely will.  Let us say that thug 1 kills you.  Are you worse off? According 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  David	  Boonin	  is	  responsible	  for	  this	  formulation.	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to the Temporal Account, you are.  However, on the Counterfactual Account, the answer must be 
no because thug 2 would have killed you anyway (stipulating that thug 2 kills you at the same 
time and in the same way).  There are also cases in which the Counterfactual Account is better 
than the Temporal Account.  Say, for example, that you are sick and that someone is bringing 
you medication.  When the person arrives with the medication, I lock the door.  In this case, 
according to the Temporal Account, I did not harm you because I did not make you worse off 
than you were before I locked the door.  However, I did make you worse off than you would 
otherwise have been.  Therefore, the Counterfactual Account can account for the harm in this 
example while the Temporal account cannot.  Because the Counterfactual Account gets it right in 
some cases while the Temporal Comparative account gets the right answers in others, I will stick 
with the Counterfactual Account for the purpose of my arguments.6 
 Another alternative to the Counterfactual Account of harm is the Comparative/Non-
Comparative Hybrid Account.  On this account, if A’s act harms B, then A’s act causes B to 
suffer a comparative harm.7   In this case, A’s act harms B if A’s act stands in a certain relation 
to B’s being harmed.  There are two components to this claim: the relation and B’s being harmed.  
B’s being harmed is the comparative part of the account.  The harm here is comparative in the 
sense that B is worse off than B would have been if A had not performed the act.  On the other 
hand, the non-­‐comparative	  comparative	  part	  of	  the	  view	  is	  the	  harm.	  	  Harms	  are	  just	  harms	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  rather	  than	  because	  they	  made	  you	  worse	  than	  you	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been.	  	  People	  who	  hold	  this	  view	  have	  a	  sort	  if	  list	  of	  things	  that	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  harms.	  	  If	  one	  suffers	  a	  harm	  then	  they	  are	  thereby	  made	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  otherwise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  alternative	  accounts	  of	  harm	  are	  from	  notes	  taken	  in	  David	  Boonin’s	  section	  of	  the	  Ethics	  Pro-­‐seminar.	  7	  The	  relation	  of	  causation	  itself	  might	  be	  comparative.	  	  If	  some	  version	  of	  the	  counterfactual	  theory	  of	  causation	  is	  correct,	  then	  causation	  is	  itself	  comparative.	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would	  have	  been.	  	  For	  instance,	  pain	  is	  a	  harm	  even	  if	  the	  situation	  is	  such	  that	  you	  would	  have	  been	  worse	  were	  you	  not	  in	  that	  pain.	  	  Say	  you	  are	  in	  10	  units	  of	  pain	  and	  someone	  gives	  you	  a	  pain	  killer	  that	  takes	  away	  all	  10	  units	  of	  pain	  and	  then	  gives	  you	  5,	  rather	  than	  a	  pain	  killer	  that	  takes	  away	  5	  of	  the	  10	  you	  have.	  	  On	  this	  view,	  because	  you	  have	  been	  harmed	  by	  receiving	  the	  pain	  killer	  (because	  you	  have	  been	  made	  to	  suffer	  pain),	  you	  are	  thereby	  made	  worse	  off.	  	  	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  considering	  that	  if	  you	  had	  not	  been	  made	  to	  suffer	  the	  harm	  you	  would	  be	  in	  10	  rather	  than	  5	  units	  of	  pain.	  	  Thus,	  you	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  made	  worse	  off	  than	  you	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been.8  
This account does not say anything about what would have happened had A not harmed B.  
Though A’s act may cause B to suffer a comparative harm, this same act might in fact benefit 
that person or make B better off than B would otherwise have been had A not harmed B.  Say for 
instance that a woman is about to be evicted from her house.  However, that day, as she is 
walking her dog, a man drops a large emerald from the window of a skyscraper near her and 
gives her a black eye.  Let us stipulate that there is no way for her to determine who dropped the 
gem from the window and therefore she cannot return it.  In this case, it seems that though the 
man’s act causes the woman to suffer a harm, since the woman gets to keep the gem, the woman 
is more than compensated for that harm.  Because the act harmed her in one respect (the 
condition of her eye), but benefited her overall, it seems that the correct view of harm should 
account for B’s state before the harmful act takes place.	  
 Finally, there is the Non-Comparative account of harm, which can be attributed to 
Elizabeth Harman.  On this account, A’s act harms B if A’s act causes B to be in a bad state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This	  would	  only	  count	  as	  a	  hybrid	  account	  if	  one	  has	  a	  particular	  view	  of	  causation.	  	  If	  your	  account	  of	  causation	  holds	  that	  causation	  itself	  is	  comparative,	  then	  the	  account	  is	  straightforwardly	  comparative.	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This account does not make the claim that A’s act harm’s B if A’s act causes B to be in a worse 
state.  Thus, on this view, A’s act harms B if A’s act causes B to be in a bad state, even if the 
alternative would be for B to be in a worse state.  Harman does not claim that A’s harming B is 
sufficient for making B worse off than B otherwise would have been.  Whereas other accounts of 
harm give necessary conditions, Harman attempts to provide an alternative sufficient condition.  
According to Harman, you can harm someone by putting that person in a bad state even if that 
act does not make them worse off than they otherwise would have been.  Thus, to make someone 
worse off is neither sufficient nor necessary for harm.  For instance,  
A woman is raped, becomes pregnant, and ends up raising the child. The woman is 
remarkably able to separate the trauma of the rape from her attitude to the child, and they 
have a normal and healthy parent-child relationship. The woman’s life is better, due to 
the value to her of the relationship with her child, than it would have been if she had not 
been raped, even taking into account the trauma of the rape. This woman loves her child. 
She does not wish that she had not been raped, because if she had not been raped, then 
her child would not exist. 9 
   
 
This example is meant to show that the Counterfactual Account of harm is false and the Non-
Comparative account is true.  In this example, the woman seems to have been made better off 
than you would otherwise have been, yet harmed.  However, there are some problems with 
Harman’s account.  Harman’s account seems to be caught in a dilemma.  Either it is trivial, 
because the comparative account would reach the same conclusions, or, in cases where there is a 
difference, Harman’s account would have to prefer the choice that would only benefit you rather 
than the choice that would harm and benefit you even if the choice that both harms and benefits 
you would leave you better off, which is implausible.  Harman’s Alternative Possibility Principle 
states that a harmful act would cause a greater amount of benefit than harm to the harmed person 
is not enough to render the act morally permissible if there is an available alternative act that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Elizabeth	  Harman,	  “Can	  We	  Harm	  and	  Benefit	  in	  Creating?,”	  Philosophical	  Perspectives	  18	  (2004):	  99.	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would harmlessly confer comparable benefits on someone else.  The question is what is meant by 
“comparable benefits.”  If Harman means comparable gross benefit, then her account is no 
different from the comparative account because she allows that harm can be compensated for by 
enough benefit.  For instance, in the rape case, the Comparative Account can say that she was 
harmed because she was made worse off than she would otherwise have been in some respects, 
yet was overall better off.  Thus, the Comparative Account can account for the harm done in 
these kinds of cases.  If Harman means comparable net benefit, then in cases in which the two 
acts are different, she would have to prefer the one that leaves you in a worse state.  Consider the 
pin killer case again.  There ate two pain killers.  One will relieve your pain by taking away all 
10 units of pain and giving you 5 units of pain.  The other will relieve your pain by just taking 
away 5 units of your pain.  Let us stipulate that both painkillers work simultaneously and that 
you cannot feel the difference.  In this case, both painkillers get the same result.  In cases where 
you get the same end result, the Comparative Account agrees with the Non-comparative Account.   
However, if the case is such that the one painkiller relieves your pain by taking away all 10 units 
of pain and giving you 4.9 units of pain whereas the other relieves your pain by just taking away 
5 units of pain, Harman has to say that you should prefer the pain killer that relieves your pain by 
just taking away 5 units of pain even though that would leave you in .1 more units of pain.  This 
is because the painkiller that just takes away 5 units of pain only benefits you whereas the other 
painkiller harms and benefits you.  However, the painkiller that just benefits you leaves you in a 
worse state; it leaves you in more pain than you would have been in had you chosen to take the 
other painkiller.  So, on one horn of the dilemma, what Harman says is trivial because the 
Comparative Account gets the same results.  On the other horn, the account is implausible 
because in cases in which the results of the two acts are different it has the absurd consequence 
	  	   9	  
that you should prefer the choice that would leave you in a worse state.  Thus, her use of the term 
comparable is too vague to be useful.  One might think that her account is then merely meant to 
be a tiebreaker.  Yet, this seems unlikely because Harman seems to care about harm.  Therefore, 
the Non-comparative Account of harm should be rejected.  
  
 
III.  The Person-affecting View 
  
 As Rebecca Bennett suggests in “The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence,” 
“…our common-sense concept of wronging…usually involves some sense of harm to persons or 
at least to sentient creatures.”10  Although there is a difference between an action being wrong 
for someone and an action making someone worse off, the two concepts are closely related.  An 
act is usually thought of as wrong only if it harms someone and to harm someone is, roughly 
speaking, to make him or her worse off.11  However, the view that an act is wrong only if it 
harms some particular individual restricts us to a person-affecting view about wrongness.  If an 
act is wrong that does not make any individual worse off, this wrongness cannot be explained in 
terms of person-affecting consequences.  Instead, the claim is that an act can be wrong because 
of some impersonal harm it causes.  The term ‘impersonal harm’ may initially sound oxymoronic. 
However, it is the goal of this paper to show that not only is this a plausible view about 
wrongness but it is the correct view.  On this view, there can be wrongness in the harm caused by 
diminishing the overall value in the world or by making the world a worse place than it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Rebecca Bennett, “The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence,” Bioethics 23 (2009): 267. 11 Some views use words like suffering but I would say that in most cases if someone is made to suffer, they are 
made worse off in someway (even if they are not made worse off overall). 
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otherwise would have been.12  Although some claim that impersonal harm is not a natural way to 
think about the claims of morality, there are several cases, such as Wilma’s case, that show that 
we do find actions wrong which do not wrong any particular individual.  In these cases, an 
appeal can be made to the wrong done when a person’s actions cause the world to be in a worse 
state than it otherwise would have been in.   
 A common sense account of harm is that to harm someone is to make them worse off.  A 
connection is often made between harm and compensation.  Many believe that if you harm 
someone, you should compensate them or bring them back to the point they would have been if 
you had not harmed them.  For example, if you break someone’s windshield, you should pay to 
have it fixed in order to compensate that person.  Similarly, a common sense account of wrong is 
that to wrong someone is to harm them in some way, or make them worse off.  We often think 
that if someone has not harmed you, then you have no moral claim against that person.  On this 
view, if Wilma’s act did not make Pebbles worse off, then Pebbles was not harmed by Wilma’s 
act and, therefore, Wilma’s act was not wrong and Pebbles has no moral claim against her.  
Though you can be harmed without being wronged, on this view you cannot be wronged without 
being harmed.  We are harmed or made worse off all of the time without being wronged.  For 
instance, when a person stubs his toe, he can be said to have been harmed or made worse off, but 
not to have been wronged.  On the other hand, people are not typically said to have been 
wronged unless they have been harmed in some way.13   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Bennett, “The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence,” 268.	  13	  However,	  some	  people	  think	  you	  can	  be	  wronged	  without	  being	  harmed.	  Suppose	  you	  promise	  to	  do	  whatever	  I	  ask	  you.	  I	  then	  ask	  you	  to	  harm	  me	  and	  not	  to	  benefit	  me	  in	  any	  way.	  You	  then	  only	  benefit	  me	  (perhaps	  by	  paying	  off	  my	  mortgage,	  or	  curing	  my	  disease).	  Some	  might	  claim	  that	  you	  have	  wronged	  me,	  by	  breaking	  your	  promise.	  But,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  promise,	  you	  can’t	  have	  harmed	  me.	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 People are generally drawn to the person-affecting view, or the view that if an act is bad 
it must be “bad for” someone.  On this view, an act that affects no existing person for the worse, 
and maximizes (or at least predictably maximizes) well-being for every future person cannot be 
wrong.  The idea that these acts cannot be wrong holds even if that same act makes the world 
worse in some impersonal sense.  For instance, a certain act may not be worse for any particular 
individual, yet it might create less well-being in the aggregate when more might have been 
created.14  On the person- affecting view, such an act cannot be wrong.  The non-identity 
problem purports to show that these beliefs cannot both be correct.  Either the person-affecting 
view is correct and our intuition that Wilma’s act is wrong is misguided, or the person-affecting 
view is false.  I want to argue that our intuitions about cases like these are correct and that the 
person-affecting view is false.  
  It may be concluded from the argument that Pebbles would not have existed had Wilma 
taken the pill that because Wilma’s act did not harm Pebbles, it did not wrong her.  If someone 
believes that an act cannot be wrong unless it is wrong for someone, he may also conclude that 
Wilma’s act was not wrong.  This seems very counterintuitive.  Though one might argue that the 
fact that this conclusion does not line up with our intuitions is not enough to show that Wilma’s 
act was wrong, it can be shown that Wilma’s act was wrong by appealing to more than just 
common sense intuitions.  I will begin by setting forth and rejecting some other popular solutions 
to this problem.   Then, I will show that Wilma’s action was wrong because it created less value 
in the world when more could have been created. 
 
IV.  Some Solutions  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Melinda Roberts, "The Nonidentity Problem," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/nonidentity-problem/>. 
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 The claim that Wilma’s act did not harm Pebbles is controversial.  Some people reject P1 
of the formalized argument above.  One way that people argue that Wilma’s act did in fact harm 
Pebbles is to reject the non-identity problem all together.  In these cases, it is claimed that 
whichever child Wilma chose to have, the blind child or the sighted child, was Pebbles.  
However, due to facts about our actual reproductive systems, Wilma’s child would be a different 
child depending on when she chose to conceive.  Parfit refers to this assertion as the Time-
Dependence Claim.  He says, “If any particular person had not been conceived within a month of 
the time when he was in fact conceived, he would in fact never have existed.”15  If one believes 
in physical or mental continuity and that the mind is in some way related to the brain and you 
accept the claim that Pebbles’ existence is not worse than her non-existence (because she has a 
life worth living), then you would accept the premise that Wilma’s act does not make Pebbles 
worse off than she otherwise would have been.   
 Others claim that Pebbles was in fact harmed by Wilma’s act by appealing to rights.  One 
way to take this approach is to say that Pebbles had a right to a good start in life but this right 
was violated.  However, because the circumstances under which she was born were the only 
circumstance she could have been born under, this right could not have been fulfilled.  One 
might claim that because this right could not be fulfilled, it could not be violated.  An objection 
to this would be that it is wrong to bring someone into existence with a right that cannot be 
fulfilled.16  Yet, it is highly unlikely that a child in this situation would believe that their mother 
acted wrongly considering that the alternative would have been for them to have never existed.  
Had the mother waited to conceive a child she would have been able to provide a different child 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 352.	  16	  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 364.	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with a better start in life.  According to Parfit, an appeal to a right that could not be fulfilled may 
provide some objection to our choice because we cannot just assume that a child in Pebbles’ 
position would just waive this right because he or she does not regret their mother acting this 
way (because he or she does not think it would have been better for them if they had never 
existed).17   
 Yet, the idea that we all have rights that are nomologically	  impossible	  to	  satisfy	  seems	  absurd.	  	  Should	  we	  say	  that	  short	  people	  have	  a	  right	  to	  be	  taller	  or	  that	  men	  have	  a	  right	  to	  conceive	  children?	  	  If	  not,	  why	  would	  anyone	  think	  that	  everyone	  has	  a	  right	  not	  to	  be	  congenitally	  blind?	  	  Either	  this	  view	  of	  rights	  is	  absurd	  or	  it	  is	  a	  different	  view	  of	  rights,	  which	  is	  pretty	  clear	  to	  not	  have	  much,	  if	  anything,	  to	  do	  with	  wrongness.	  	  This	  view	  of	  rights	  would	  not	  be	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  morality.	  	  It	  would	  not	  say	  anything	  about	  what	  people	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  do.	  	  You	  cannot	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  make	  blind	  people	  sighted.	  	  And	  where	  would	  it	  end?	  	  Should	  we	  have	  a	  right	  to	  everything	  it	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  have.	  	  For	  instance	  should	  people	  have	  a	  right	  to	  not	  be	  bald?	  	  Rights	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  connected	  with	  reasons	  for	  behavior. 
  
V.  Solutions which Reject the Person-Affecting View 
  
 On the person-affecting view, an act is only right or wrong if it causes some particular 
individual to be better or worse off.  However, Wilma’s case shows that an act can be wrong 
even if it does not make some particular person worse off.  In this case, the act was wrong due to 
some impersonal harm it caused.  In “The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 365.	  
	  	   14	  
Chance of the Best Life,” Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane defend the Principle of Procreative 
Beneficence (PPB).  According to this principle,  
“If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, 
then they have a significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they 
could have, whose life can be expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go 
best or at least not worse than any of the others.”18   
 
On this view, if people have the opportunity to select which child they will bring into the world 
through genetic testing or in vitro fertilization, for example, they should choose the child that 
will have the best chance of a good life.  Although this moral reason can be overridden, for 
instance, in cases in which choosing the child with the best chance of a good life might bring 
about considerable harm to others, it still carries significant weight.  This view does not claim 
that Wilma’s act was wrong because it harmed Pebbles or violated her rights.  Nor does it claim 
that Wilma’s act was wrong because it harmed someone else.  Rather, it claims that how our 
actions will affect the world gives us some moral reason to choose one action over another.  In 
the case of selecting future people who will inhabit this world, we have some moral reason to 
choose to have sighted children rather than blind children because sighted children’s lives can (in 
light of available relevant information) be expected to go best, or at least not worse than the lives 
of others.  As Julian Savulescu claims, it is “bad that blind and deaf children are born when 
sighted and hearing children could have been born in their place.”19  Bringing more individuals 
than necessary into the world that will face undesirable challenges is morally undesirable.20  
 The Principle of Procreative Beneficence instructs reproducers to select the child who can 
be expected to enjoy the most well-being in life.  This principle can be applied to Wilma’s case.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane, “The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best 
Life,” Bioethics 23 (2009): 274. 19 Savulescu and Kahane, “The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life,” 
Bioethics, 274.  	  20	  Bennett, “The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence,” 267.	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In the example, Wilma went to see a doctor before she conceived.  When this doctor informed 
her that she could easily prevent a blind child from being brought into existence at almost no 
expense to her, the Principle of Procreative Beneficence directed her to wait a month and give 
birth to a sighted child with a greater chance of the most possible well-being.  Because Wilma 
had a choice between possible children she could have, selection was possible for her.  
According to the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, Wilma should have chosen to take the 
pills, wait a month, and give birth to a sighted child who would be expected to have a better 
chance of enjoying the most well being in his life.  On this view, Wilma’s	  act	  was	  not	  morally	  preferred	  because,	  in	  performing	  it,	  she	  failed	  to	  select	  the	  child,	  of	  the	  possible	  children	  she	  could	  have	  had,	  whose	  life	  could	  be	  expected,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  relevant	  available	  information,	  to	  go	  best.	  	  	   
 PPB takes into consideration the life of the child, but fails to consider how the child’s life 
will affect other people.  Again, PPB claims that when a person is planning to have a child and 
selection is possible that, she should choose to conceive the child whose life would be expected 
to not go worse than another.  This principle says nothing about how that child’s life might affect 
the lives of others.  It is possible that the child whose life would be expected to go best for him 
might have considerably bad effects on the lives of others.  Say for instance that a woman is 
planning to conceive and has the choice to conceive either Everyman or Superman.  Everyman 
would have a fine life and Superman would have an amazing life.  However, Superman would 
cause a great deal of misery for other people.  PPB would tell you that you have the most moral 
reason to conceive Superman and for this reason, this principle is too restrictive.  Further, this 
principle cannot solve the non-identity problem because it is a principle about what we have 
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moral reason to do.  If we are to solve the non-identity problem we need a principle about 
wrongness; a principle which tells us why Wilma’s act was wrong. 
 In the case of procreative selection, an appeal can also be made to how the act of 
selection can affect the overall expected value in the world.  Whereas the Principle of Procreative 
Beneficence entails that an act can be bad if it brings about less individual well-being (well-
being for a specific individual) when it could have brought more (to someone else), the Principle 
of General Procreative Beneficence (PGPB) entails that an act can be bad if it decreases the 
overall expected value in the world.  In “Procreative Beneficence- Cui Bono?,”  Jakob Elster 
advances his view of what we have moral reason to do when making decisions about child 
selection.  According to the Principle of General Procreative Beneficence, “If couples (or single 
reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, then they have a significant 
moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life will 
maximize the expected overall value in the world.”21  One might wonder what makes one state of 
the world more valuable than another.  But, as Elster claims, we do not have to answer this 
difficult question.  Elster states that when making selective choices, “We simply need to know 
whether the foreseeable difference that it will make that this child rather than that child is born, is 
a difference for the better.”22   Thus, if there is a difference between choices that will impact the 
value in the world, we should make the choice that, for the foreseeable future, will contribute the 
most to the world’s overall value.  
 In Wilma’s case, the Principle of General Procreative Beneficence would suggest that she 
choose to take the pills, wait a month, and conceive a sighted child.  On this view, Although 
Wilma’s act did not harm Pebbles or any other particular individual, it was not morally preferred 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Jakob Elster, “Procreative Beneficence- Cui Bono?,” Bioethics 25 (2011): 483. 22	  Elster, “Procreative Beneficence- Cui Bono?,” 483.	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because it did not maximize the expected overall value of the world.  Wilma had a choice 
between possible children she could have.  She could choose to conceive a blind child 
immediately or a sighted child later.  This view is not meant to maximize individual well-being 
(by this I mean well being for a specific individual, not total well being, all of which is located in 
different individuals) like the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, but is meant to maximize the 
overall value in the world.  Because a sighted child would reasonably be expected to contribute 
more to the world’s overall value than a blind child, Wilma should have chosen to conceive the 
sighted child.  PGPB would recognize Wilma’s act as bad because she knowingly made a choice 
to bring a child into existence whose life was not expected to maximize the overall value in the 
world.  
 PGPB is better than PPB because unlike PPB, PGPB instructs us to consider the lives of 
others as well as the life of the child to be created.  In the case mentioned above, PGPB would 
tell us that when selection is possible and our choice is the Everyman or the Superman, we have 
significant moral reason to choose to have the Everyman.  Though Superman’s life would go 
better, his life would bring significant misery to the lives of others.  In light of this available 
relevant information, it seems that the life of the Everyman would maximize the expected overall 
value in the world.  This argument holds because the Everyman’s life is still expected to go fine 
and the value of the life of the Superman would be outweighed by the significant misery his life 
would bring to others.  The misery he would cause others would decrease the overall value in the 
world more than the Superman’s amazing life would increase it.  
 However, there are two main problems with this view.  First, as with PPB, PGPB only 
claims that we have “significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they 
could have, whose life will maximize the expected overall value in the world.”  It is not a 
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principle about wrongness but rather a principle about what we have the most reason to do.  In 
order to solve the non-identity problem, we need a principle that tells us why Wilma’s act was 
wrong.  Say we were to make PGPB a principle about wrongness.  On this account, if couples (or 
single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, then it would be 
morally wrong not to select the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life will 
maximize the expected overall value in the world.  However, because PGPB is a conditional 
principle, it does not address the choice of having no child at all.  The principle says that when 
selection is possible, one has a reason to choose to have the child whose life would maximize the 
overall expected values in the world.  The principle states that if a couple is deciding to have a 
child, choosing to have a child whose life will be most worth living is likely to maximize the 
overall expected value in the world.  However, it seems that our principle should allow the 
choice of having no child at all to be morally permissible and it should take this choice into 
consideration.  In order to account for the wrongness in Wilma’s act and to establish that it is 
morally permissible to choose to have no child at all when selection is possible, we need an even 
more generalized principle than PGPB. 
 I want to suggest the following principle: if when making choices which will affect who 
will later live, A decides to perform the act that will not maximize the overall expected value in 
the world, then that act is morally wrong.23  Let us call this principle PGPB*.  PGPB* is not 
merely a principle about reasons, but a principle about wrongness of actions.  Wilma did not 
harm Pebbles by bringing her into existence.  Even if we stipulate that Wilma’s act did not harm 
anyone, including herself, I still want to say that her act was wrong.  This argument hinges on the 
view that although Wilma’s act did not wrong Pebbles or any other individual, it was still wrong 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  For	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  some	  rights	  can	  trump	  value,	  a	  clause	  could	  be	  added	  which	  says	  that	  there	  are	  some	  important	  rights	  that	  might	  block	  the	  promotion	  of	  value.	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because by bringing an impaired child into existence, Wilma knowingly made the choice that 
was not expected to maximize the overall value in the world.  Although a blind person has a life 
that is worth living, it is likely that a blind person’s life is worse in certain respects than a sighted 
person.  The world is in a better state when it is filled with people who will enjoy more well-
being in life.  If all who exist were to have lives that are worse, then the overall value in the 
world would be expected to be lower.  Therefore, it is better if we bring those into existence who 
are expected to have more well-being in their lives.  According to our definition of harm, A’s act 
harms B if A’s act makes B worse than B otherwise would have been.  In this example, Wilma’s 
act makes the world worse than it otherwise would have been by lowering the expected value in 
it.  Wilma knowingly bringing a child into existence with a disability that was expected to have a 
negative impact on the world’s overall value was wrong. 
 Theoretically	  speaking,	  if	  bringing	  a	  child	  into	  the	  world	  would	  positively	  contribute	  to	  the	  world’s	  overall	  value,	  then,	  in	  accordance	  with	  PGPB*,	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  have	  the	  child.	  	  If	  a	  child	  will	  have	  a	  life	  that	  is	  worth	  living,	  that	  child	  will	  positively	  contribute	  to	  the	  world’s	  overall	  value	  given	  that	  such	  a	  child	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  world’s	  value	  by	  the	  effects	  of	  his	  or	  her	  life	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  others.	  	  If	  selection	  is	  possible	  when	  making	  choices	  that	  will	  affect	  who	  will	  later	  live,	  one	  should	  have	  the	  child	  that	  will	  best	  contribute	  to	  the	  world’s	  overall	  value.	  	  Further,	  if	  it	  can	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  that	  you	  will	  have	  a	  child	  whose	  life	  is	  worth	  living,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  one	  should	  have	  a	  child.	  	  	   	   However,	  there	  are	  many	  things	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  when	  making	  such	  a	  choice.	  	  For	  instance, there is always the chance that if Wilma had given birth to 
a sighted child, this child could have been a criminal and possibly negatively impacted the 
overall expected value in the world more than the blind child would have.  It is also possible that 
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the blind child could cause more happiness in the world and therefore be more likely to 
maximize the expected value in the world. We must consider the total effect. Any reason we 
would have to focus on a particular individual would be merely practical.  However, we cannot 
know the total effect.  Since we cannot know the total effect of our actions, all we can take into 
consideration when making a decision is which choice will reasonably be expected to have the 
best outcome (which choice will maximize the world’s value).   In this case, one would expect 
that a sighted child would be better off than a blind child and more likely to maximize overall 
expected value in the world.  Therefore, the objection to Wilma’s decision still holds. 
 Again, maybe it would be better if Wilma were to have no child at all.  Maybe	  we	  should	  consider	  whether	  having	  any	  child	  would	  make	  things	  better	  or	  worse	  instead	  of	  only	  thinking	  about	  which	  child	  would	  have	  a	  better	  consequence.	  	  Whereas	  PPB	  and	  PGPB	  seems	  to	  only	  apply	  to	  choices	  between	  children,	  this	  principle	  allows	  for	  the	  choice	  to	  have	  no	  children	  at	  all	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  	  Having no child will not lessen the overall value that 
already exists yet having a child has the potential to increase or diminish value in the world. If 
the goal is to maximize overall value, having no child at all may be the safest choice.  Bringing a 
child into existence has an affect on more than just the child’s life and the lives of those closely 
connected to him, such as his immediate family.  For example, overpopulation is increasingly 
posing a threat to the amount of resources available to us.  It is possible that one child’s life can 
require enough resources to take away a small amount from everyone else in the community and 
lower the value in the world.  Having no child at all could not possibly make the world worse off 
than it was before (before the action took place). This principle implies that we are always 
obligated to make the world as good as we can make it.  Since having a child whose life will be 
worth living could positively contribute to the world’s overall value, it seems that this principle 
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does not allow for the choice to have no child at all in these cases.  However, because of 
uncertainty about whether a child’s life will lower or contribute to the world’s overall value, we 
should allow for choice.  In	  the	  real	  world	  we	  cannot	  know	  that	  x	  will	  be	  the	  better	  choice.	  	  We	  typically	  do	  not	  know	  which	  child	  or	  whether	  having	  any	  child	  at	  all	  will	  best	  contribute	  to	  the	  world’s	  overall	  value.	  	  Thus,	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  we	  are	  permitted	  to	  have	  no	  child	  at	  all.	  	  Similarly,	  due	  to	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  we	  are	  not	  obligated	  to	  have	  no	  child	  at	  all	  even	  if	  it	  might	  be	  even	  better	  for	  us	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Since	  we	  cannot	  know	  the	  total	  effect	  of	  our	  choices,	  we	  should	  allow	  for	  choice	  in	  decisions	  about	  reproduction.	  	  Yet,	  in	  cases	  where	  you	  can	  be	  pretty	  confidant	  that	  one	  choice	  will	  be	  better	  than	  another	  you	  should	  make	  the	  better	  choice.	  	  When	  the	  choices	  are	  blind	  child	  or	  sighted	  child	  and	  that	  is	  all	  we	  know,	  we	  should	  choose	  to	  bring	  the	  sighted	  child	  into	  existence. 	  
 There are other worries concerning PGPB*.  For instance, PGPB* also seems to imply 
that if selection is possible, then one is obligated to use this process to bring the child into 
existence whose life would best contribute to the world’s overall value.  However, the processes 
and procedures pertaining to selection can be dangerous.  Because of this, one might think the 
principle is too demanding.  There have been instances in which prenatal testing has caused birth 
defects or endangered the life of the fetus.  Additionally, there is usually nothing wrong with the 
fetus being tested.  In these cases, prenatal testing has no benefits.  If there is no benefit and also 
the possibility of a negative effect (harm to the fetus), then one should not be morally obligated 
to undergo the procedure.  Therefore, whether or not one is obligated to submit to such 
procedures depends on the test.  It depends on what the risks might be and whether or not there 
are any benefits.  If the risks are minimal and the benefits are significant, one should undergo 
prenatal testing. 
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VI.  The Risky Policy 
 Another example in which we can see how an act might be wrong without being wrong 
for anyone is Parfit’s Risky Policy case.24  By considering our obligations to future generations, 
the existence of impersonal harm becomes clearer.  The example goes as follows: 
As a community, we must choose between two energy policies.  Both would be completely 
safe for at least three centuries, but one would have certain risks in the further future.  This 
policy involves the burial of nuclear waste in areas where, in the next few centuries, there is 
no risk of an earthquake.  But since this waste will remain radioactive for thousands of years, 
there will be risks in the distant future.  If we choose this Risky Policy, the standard of living 
will be somewhat higher over the next century.  We do choose this policy.  As a result, there 
is a catastrophe many centuries later.  Because of geological changes to the Earth’s surface, 
an earthquake releases radiation, which kills thousands of people.  Though they are killed by 
this catastrophe, these people will have lives that are worth living.  We can assume that this 
radiation affects only people who are born after its release, and that it gives them an 
incurable disease that will kill them about the age of 40.  This disease has no effects before it 
kills.25  
 
In this case, as in the Wilma case, the people who are affected by the choice would never have 
existed had another choice been made.  The non-identity problem is still in effect here.  The 
policy chosen will affect who will later live.  After a few centuries, no person living would have 
come into existence had the other policy been chosen.  But because their lives are worth living, 
and they do not suffer before they die, we have not harmed them by bringing them into existence.   
 Choosing the risky policy did not harm anyone because the people whose existence 
depended on this decision had lives worth living.  These people, who will have worthwhile but 
shortened lives, were born into the only circumstances that they could have been born into.  
However, since this choice will lead to thousands of deaths, it seems like the act is still morally 
wrong.  Any claim someone can make about this act’s wrongness cannot be grounded in the fact 
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that these people’s lives were made worse off.  These people’s lives were not made worse off, 
because the other option would have been for them to never exist and we would not say it would 
be better for them if they had never existed.  As Parfit states, “Some believe that what is bad 
must be bad for someone.”26  If we hold this view, even though it will cause a great lowering of 
the quality of life in the future, there is no objection to our choice to adopt the policy that will 
lead to thousands of untimely deaths.  Because the great lowering of the quality of life should 
provide some moral reason not to choose the Risky Policy, this view should be rejected.27 The 
view Parfit refers to is the person-affecting view.  As I have shown, the wrongness in this case 
cannot be person-affecting.  The harm done was impersonal because no individual’s welfare was 
affected (excluding those who enjoyed a higher standard of living over the first century after the 
decision was made).  Again, I want to say that the reason this act was wrong is that it lowered, 
rather than maximized, the world’s overall expected value.  The world is certainly in a worse 
state when thousands of people or more die due to the decisions of a community.      
 In fact, Parfit has similar reactions to this case and others like it.  He maintains that it 
does not make a moral difference that the risky policy will be worse for no one.  Parfit refers to 
this as the No-Difference View.28  We can surely remember a time when we thought about how 
our actions might affect future generations.  For example, when we recycle, try to conserve 
resources, or are concerned with new methods of fueling vehicles, we often imagine how those 
decisions might impact those who will live after us.  When we become aware of the non-identity 
problem and that in light of this problem our actions may not actually affect particular future 
people, I do not think this concern loses its force.  Likewise, Parfit affirms that he did not 
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become less concerned about the effects of our decisions on future generations after becoming 
aware of the non-identity problem.29  He argues that it would be bad if there were a great 
lowering of the quality of life in the future and that it would not be worse if it were to in fact 
affect particular individuals as it would in same people choices.30  Same people choices are those 
in which the same people will later live regardless of which choice we make.  Same people 
choices affect neither the identities of future people nor the number of people who will exist.31  
Parfit’s discussion of the Risky Policy case concerns different people choices but same number 
choices.  Same number choices are choices in which the same number of people will live 
regardless of our choice.  Same number choices do affect the identities of future people, but not 
their number. 
 According to Parfit, accepting the No-Difference View has important theoretical 
implications.  He makes the assumption that causing someone to exist does not thereby benefit 
this person.32  If we accept the No-Difference View, and believe that we do not benefit someone 
by bringing him into existence, what Parfit calls Q and V can be drawn.  Parfit puts Q as follows: 
“If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it will be 
worse if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have 
lived.”33  V is Parfit’s version of the person-affecting view.  V is stated as, “It will be worse if 
people are affected for the worse.”34  If we accept the no difference view, then, in same number 
choices, we should appeal to Q rather than V.  Parfit stipulates that Q applies only in same 
number choices because in same people choices Q and V coincide.  In the Risky Policy case, if 	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we choose the risky policy, the quality of life will be lower in the future.  However, our choice 
will not be bad for any particular individual, because their existence depended on this choice.  
Whereas Q specifies that our act has had a bad effect, V does not.  Further, Parfit claims that if 
we believe the No-Difference View, this bad effect would not be worse even if it were worse for 
particular people.  If the Risky Policy were to be a same people choice it would affect particular 
individuals.  In this case, the fact that this decision would affect particular people would not 
make it a worse decision than it would be if it affected no one in particular.  Therefore, Parfit 
concludes, the person-affecting view, or V, gives us the wrong answer in cases like the Risky 
Policy case.  On the other hand, Q explains the effects that we believe to be bad about these 
kinds of examples.35 
 There are two problems with Q.  First, it merely explains why we think the choice of the 
risky policy is bad, not our intuition that is wrong.  If we are to solve the non-identity problem, 
we need a principle that explains the wrongness in these kinds of examples.  Again, we should 
appeal to PGPB*.  According to this principle, choosing the risky policy was wrong because it 
lowered rather than maximized the overall expected value in the world.  Choosing a policy, 
which would lead to the untimely deaths of thousands of people or more, would not be expected 
to maximize the overall expected value in the world.  Secondly, Q only applies to same number 
choices.  Q specifies that the act of choosing the risky policy would have a bad effect, but only in 
choices in which the same number of people will later live.  Since this incredibly unlikely, we 
need a principle that applies to different number cases.  It seems more likely that there would be 
fewer people because conditions would have gotten worse.  PGPB* addresses different number 
choices.  PGPB* pertains to the total value of the lives of whoever comes into existence.  
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VII.  Objections 
  
 In “The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence,” Bennett acknowledges that 
if we have moral reasons not to choose the risky policy, these reasons must have to do with 
avoiding creating a worse world rather than being out of the concern for the welfare of 
individuals.   As Bennett claims, “If harm is done it is done not to the people who will live in the 
future, but in the sense of creating a world that has less value than it might have done [sic].”36  
However, she maintains that the possibility of the notion of impersonal harm is only plausible in 
that it can explain the intuitive response to cases like Parfit’s Risky Policy case.  According to 
Bennett, an account of harm that holds that it is possible to do harm without harming any 
particular individual is too abstract and difficult to grasp.  On her view, the Principle of 
Procreative Beneficence fails solely because it is theoretically founded on this notion of 
impersonal harm.  She claims that this argument is only advanced because one might think it is 
the only way that we can explain our intuitions about cases like Wilma’s and the Risky Policy 
example.37 
 Instead of appealing to impersonal harm, Bennett attempts to explain our intuitions about 
the Risky Policy example and others like it by appealing to a notion of preference.  According to 
Bennett, our intuitions about these cases can be explained by preference rather than morality.38  
She argues that if no particular individual is harmed by the choice of the Risky Policy, then that 
decision was no longer within the realms of morality.  Therefore, she claims that this was no 
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longer a moral choice, but merely a preference for one policy over the other.  On this view, the 
reasons for choosing one policy over the other would not be moral reasons.  She holds that these 
are merely preferences for which sort of world one might think he would prefer to live in.  In 
Wilma’s case, the choice would just be about what sorts of children one believes she would 
prefer to have.  Bennett states, “So long as we expect the lives to be created to be worthwhile (i.e. 
not dominated by pain and suffering) then it is a matter of moral indifference which lives we 
choose to bring to birth.”39  Therefore, since those who will later live as a result of Wilma’s 
choice or choosing the Risky Policy will have lives worth living, it was a morally neutral 
decision.  We might have a strong preference for choosing a sighted embryo over a blind embryo 
or a safe policy over a risky policy, but we can say little more than that we find contrary 
preferences disagreeable.  Bennett maintains that because there can be no moral obligation to 
choose one worthwhile life over another, and the people who would come into existence due to 
these contrary preferences will have lives worth living, we have no moral obligation to make one 
choice over the other.40  
 However, it is implausible to say that the choice of the risky policy was not a moral 
choice.  It seems that there is much more at stake in these cases.  For one, in the Risky Policy 
case, this choice was at least a moral choice in that one policy would bring about a higher quality 
of life for the first century whereas the other would not.  This would be a moral choice in the 
sense that, in the first century, it will benefit people who already existed when the choice was 
made.  Though Bennett claims that they had no moral reasons to choose one policy over another, 
how a policy will affect the well-being of a community certainly gives one moral reasons to 
choose one policy over the other, even if these are not overriding reasons.  I maintain that the 	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Risky Policy was not the right choice, but the fact that it would positively affect the welfare of 
those who will live in the first century after the decision is made is a reason to choose the risky 
policy.  And that reason is a moral reason because the welfare of people, although not particular 
people, is at stake and welfare is certainly within the realm of morality.  In fact, because this 
choice is a moral choice, it seems that Bennett would have to favor the Risky Policy.  Though 
her view is indifferent when it comes to choices which will affect the identities of future people 
(as long as they have lives worth living), on this view, the fact that the Risky Policy will benefit 
those who already exist when the decision is made gives us some moral reason to choose the 
Risky Policy rather than the safer policy.  This is even more counterintuitive than the claim that 
morality is indifferent between the two policies. 
 Also, it seems too weak to claim that which policy should be chosen is merely a matter of 
preference, even if we are considering only those whose existence will depend on which policy is 
chosen (not those who will live in the first century after the decision is made).  Although the 
decision does not affect the welfare of particular individuals, it does have an effect on the 
welfare of those who will later live, no matter who they are.  Regardless of the fact that those 
who will live will have lives worth living, the choice of the Risky Policy is the wrong choice.  
The people who would have lived had the safer policy been chosen would have been expected to 
have better lives overall, which were not cut short by disease and death.  We have a moral 
obligation to make the choice that would be expected to maximize overall value in the world.  
Even though we did not harm those who will be brought into existence after the risky policy is 
chosen, it would not have been worse if we had chosen to bring into existence those who would 
later have lived had we chosen the safer policy.  If we had chosen the safer policy, the outcome 
would have been better.  It would not have been better because it would have been better for 
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particular individuals but because it would have created more value in the world.  It is not merely 
an intuition that some wrong was done by choosing the Risky Policy.  This choice was wrong 
and its wrongness can be explained by the affect this choice had on the world’s value.  
 A similar argument follows in Wilma’s case.  It is too weak to claim that Wilma’s choice 
to have a blind child was a morally neutral decision and that which child she chose to conceive 
was merely a matter of preference.  Although it was not worse for anyone in particular for Wilma 
to choose to have the blind child, it also would not have been worse for anyone if Wilma had 
chosen to conceive the sighted child instead.  If two choices are equal in every respect except one, 
and one is better than the other in that respect, we have reason to choose the one that is better in 
that respect.  Therefore, if the two embryos are equal in every respect except that one will be 
born as a blind child and the other will be born as a sighted child, and it is expected to be better 
to be sighted than to be blind, we have a reason to choose to conceive the sighted child.  This 
reason is a moral reason because the decision could be expected to have an impact on the world’s 
overall value.  Again, Wilma’s decision to have the blind child rather than the sighted child 
would not reasonably be expected to maximize the world’s overall value. 
 In order to illustrate this point, it is worth considering another example.  Say that giving 
Wilma the pill that will prevent her child’s blindness will prevent the doctor from giving a pain-
killer to someone who is suffering from a moderate temporary condition.  Because of this, 
Wilma decides not to take the pills and, nine months later, she gives birth to the blind child.  The 
fact that giving this person a pain killer will benefit this person gives Wilma some moral reason 
to choose to have the blind child just as the fact that the Risky Policy will bring benefits to those 
who will live in the first three centuries after the decision is made gives us some moral reason to 
choose the Risky Policy.  However, because the suffering of a person with a moderate temporary 
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condition does not outweigh the effect that the blind child’s life will have on the overall expected 
value in the world, her decision to have the blind child would still be wrong. 
 The Risky Policy case may be a more compelling example than Wilma’s case because 
whereas Wilma’s choice will potentially only affect one life, the life of whichever child she 
chooses to bring into existence, the choice of the Risky Policy has the potential to affect 
thousands, millions, or even billions of lives.  I say that Wilma’s case will have an effect on one 
life, because, although it will not harm the blind child if he is to be conceived, it will affect 
Wilma’s child in that it will affect who Wilma’s child will be.  In this case, “Wilma’s child” has 
no particular identity.  Her child is simply the child that Wilma would have.  Wilma can choose 
to bring into existence either a blind child or a sighted child and her decision will have an effect 
on that child in that he will be born.  Similarly, though the choice of the Risky Policy will not 
harm any particular individuals, because they have lives worth living and would not have existed 
otherwise, this choice will have an effect on future people because it will affect who will later 
live.  If the safer policy had been chosen, presumably the same number of people would have 
lived, but they would have been different people.41  The Risky Policy case is an even more 
persuasive example than Wilma’s case, because we commonly think it is worse if thousands of 
people live worse lives than if just one person lives a worse life (despite who those people might 
be).  Also, it is likely that thousands or more lives will have more of an impact on the world’s 
overall value than one life.  
 Although some people believe that a choice cannot have a bad effect unless this choice 
has a bad effect on someone, this view is implausible.  The Risky Policy example makes it clear 
that we must reject the person-affecting view.  In this case, we knowingly made a choice that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Parfit stipulated that the same number of people would have lived regardless of which choice was made because 
if this choice involved different numbers of people, the case becomes much more difficult to analyze and this fact 
would have different implications on how we should analyze and criticize these kinds of decisions. 
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will lead to a catastrophe that kills thousands of people.  As Parfit contends, “This effect is 
clearly bad, even though our choice will be worse for no one.”42 The harm done here is 
impersonal harm, but I do not think that this should make the case any less compelling.  The 
objection to our choice is no less strong when we see that our choice will harm no one.  It does 
not make a moral difference that our acts do not harm any particular people.   
 In Wilma’s example, as in the Risky Policy example, the acts done are wrong, because 
they are not expected to maximize the world’s overall value.  Although these acts do not lower 
the welfare of any particular individuals, they lower the level of well-being of those who inhabit 
the world, whoever they may be.  The lowering of well-being of people would be expected to 
diminish the overall expected value in the world.  It is worse for the world’s value when the lives 
of those who exist are worse than the lives of those who would have lived if another choice had 
been made.  In Wilma’s case, her choice could have been expected to negatively impact the 
amount of well-being in the world, because a blind child would reasonably be expected to have 
less well-being than a sighted child, and knowing this, she chose to conceive the blind child.  In 
the Risky Policy example, the choice made brought about a lower amount of well-being in the 
world because their lives were cut short by disease whereas those who would have lived had the 
safer policy been chosen would not have been affected in this way. Even if the lives of those 
brought into existence by acts like these are worth living, these acts still have a bad effect on the 
world when they cause a worse outcome than another choice would have produced.  Not only do 
these acts have a bad effect, they are wrong.  Therefore, the person affecting view is false. 
 
VIII.  Repugnant Conclusion 
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  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 378. 
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 One restriction on solutions to the non-identity problem is modesty.  We want a principle 
that is strong, but not too strong.  We want to reject at least one premise of the argument but not 
in a way that is more implausible or absurd than the argument we are attempting to reject.  One 
of the implications of my view is known as the Repugnant Conclusion.  Though some might 
claim that this implication is more absurd than just accepting the non-identity problem, I do not 
think it is.  
 Parfit characterizes the Repugnant Conclusion as follows; “For any possible population 
of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger 
imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its 
members have lives that are barely worth living.”43  Consider the following figure: 44
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  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 388.	  	  44	  Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, and Torbjörn Tännsjö, " The Repugnant Conclusion," The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/repugnant-conclusion/>. 
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If we accept the No-Difference View we are lead to Parfit’s Impersonal Total Principle which 
states, “If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would be the greatest 
quantity of whatever makes life worth living.”45  This view implies that any loss in the quality of 
lives in a population can be compensated for by a sufficient gain in the quantity of a population.  
If this is true, we should prefer world Z in the figure above, even thought the people living in this 
world have lives that are barely worth living.  In world Z, we can expect that the world will have 
a higher overall value because there will be so many lives with a positive value. 
 Though most people have the intuition that world Z is morally undesirable, in “In 
Defense of Repugnance,” Michael Huemer shows that this intuition is mistaken and that the 
Repugnant Conclusion is true.  He claims that the simplest explanation for the truth of the 
Repugnant Conclusion is that more worthwhile lives are better and thus increasing the number of 
worthwhile lives makes the world better.  The argument runs as follows: 
(1) It is better for there to be more lives with positive welfare 
(2) The marginal value of such lives does not diminish so as to create 
an upper bound to the value of such lives 
(3) If (1) and (2), then the Repugnant Conclusion is true 
(4) So the Repugnant Conclusion is true (from (1), (2), (3))46 
The first two premises are supported by the belief that it is better for the human species to 
survive longer.  What value a life contributes to the world’s total value does not depend on when 
that life occurs.  Therefore, it should not make a difference whether we are adding lives with a 
positive welfare in the future or in space (in our current population).47  Also, a life barely worth 
living is not as bad as one might think.  In fact, many people are leading lives that are barely 
worth in our current population.  We must remember that these lives have a positive welfare 
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  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 387.	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  Michael Huemer, “In Defense of Repugnance,” Mind 117 (2008): 923.  47	  Michael Huemer, “In Defense of Repugnance,” 925.	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level.  If one does not exist, one has no welfare level at all.  Other things being equal, if you exist 
with a positive level of welfare, then the world is better if you exist than it would be without you 
because there is more value in the world.48  If we accept the formalized argument above and that 
a life barely worth living is not as bad as it may initially seem, we can see that the fact that 
PGPB* entails the Repugnant Conclusion is not an strong enough reason to reject this principle.    
  
IX.  Duties to Future Generations 
   
 I now want to discuss how this argument might influence how we think about our duties 
to future generations.  It is common to imagine how our actions will affect those who will live 
after us.  Many aspects of our daily lives include these kinds of decisions.  For example, many 
people recycle plastic, a material that does not biodegrade and will continue to exist for 
thousands of years, in hopes of reducing the amount of plastic produced.  We also try to conserve 
natural resources such as water and fossil fuels.  There has been a mass movement toward “green” 
living, a lifestyle in which people are more conscious about how their actions impact their 
environment and non-human animals.  In most cases, these decisions will not have a significant 
impact in their lifetime, but rather on the world in which future generations will live.   
 After learning about the non-identity problem, many people’s intuitions about these cases 
do not change.  For many, although they realize these acts do not harm anyone, they still seem 
wrong.  In Wilma’s case and in the Risky Policy case, the choices made do not harm any 
particular individuals.  If we believe that the person-affecting account of harm is true, we cannot 
explain the wrongness of these acts.  It appears that as long as the people who later live have 
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  Michael Huemer, “In Defense of Repugnance,” 924.	  
	  	   35	  
lives that are worth living, we do not have any obligations to future generations.  This view 
seems implausible to me.  If the decisions of our community will cause certain people to later 
come into existence, and those people will have worthwhile lives, it seems that we can select 
whichever destructive policies will be likely to ensure the highest levels of welfare in our lives 
and the lives of our children.   
 On this view, we should use as much of our natural resources as we wish.  For example, 
many people try to ride their bikes, carpool, take buses, and even walk in order to minimize their 
use of fossil fuels and help reduce the amount of destruction done to our atmosphere.  However, 
in many cases, it would be much more convenient, to not use the alternative methods of 
transportation.  It might in some cases even increase their level of well-being if they each used 
their own vehicle.  Maybe parents who take the bus to work would be able to spend more time 
with their children, if they drove themselves, and this could increase their overall welfare.  Yet, it 
seems wrong to implement these destructive policies in order to increase the level of well-being 
in our own lives.  If we choose more conservative policies not only will there likely be many 
lives that are worthwhile in the future, but those lives will also likely be more worthwhile in 
themselves.  We have a duty to make the choice that will be expected to maximize the overall 
value in the world and not merely maximize the well-being in the lives of particular individuals.  
 If, along with Bennett, we agree that any choice we make about whom to bring into 
existence merely depends on what our preferences are as long as those lives will be worth living, 
then we have no reason to consider the welfare of future generations.  If these kinds of decisions 
should only be made in accordance with what our preferences are, then everyone is free to do 
what they please when making decisions about conception or whether or not to conserve the 
world’s resources.  In this case, many people might choose to deplete our resources because it 
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would allow for a better quality of life in their lifetime.  This seems wrong.  Therefore, Bennett’s 
view about preference does not give us the right results when considering future generations.  
Instead, we should make the choices that would allow for the most well-being in our lifetimes 
and in the future.  We should not make choices that would reduce the welfare of those who will 
later live. 
 
X. Conclusion 
 
 I have argued that the person-affecting view should be rejected.  Wilma’s case, the Risky 
Policy example, and others like it make it clear that an act can be wrong, even if it does not harm 
any particular individual.  In these cases, the only way to explain the wrongness is by appealing 
to a notion of impersonal harm.  These acts are wrong because they do not maximize the overall 
expected value in the world.  These arguments also imply that we have duties to future 
generations.  We have moral reasons to act in ways that will maximize the world’s overall value 
in the future.   The wrongness in examples like Wilma’s and the Risky Policy cannot be 
explained in terms of person-affecting consequences.  However, this does not show that we 
should conclude that these decisions are outside the realm of morality.  There is a part of 
morality that is concerned with well-being and value, which can only be explained by appealing 
to impersonal harm.  We should accept this view rather than concluding that Wilma’s choice and 
the choice of the Risky Policy are not wrong and that we have no moral obligations to future 
generations. 
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